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ABSTRACT

While there has been a seemingly endless debate over whether individual
results should be disclosed in genomic research, the role that resources should
play in determining a researcher's duty has been left unanswered. This commentary fills this void by fully examining how resource limitations constrain a
researcher's duty to disclose. This paper is the first to anchor an obligation in
the duty to rescue alone, and as a result, the first to find not only an ethical
floor of what must be returned, but also a ceiling of the amount of resources
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that may be utilized to fulfill this duty. The traditional ethical research framework maintains that the purpose of research is to pursue generalizable
knowledge that will benefit society. As such, researchers have a duty to complete their study protocol. To protect this ethical obligation, the duty to rescue prohibits a researcher from committing enough resources to disclosing
individual results in such a way that the study cannot be completed. Meanwhile, the duty to rescue requires a researcher to disclose individual results
when there is a harm that can be mitigated without jeopardizing the study that
the subjects have undergone risks to complete. Therefore, the duty to rescue
incorporates resource limitations by appropriately balancing the purpose of
research and the need to protect those subjects who enroll.

INTRODUCTION

With technological advances and the steady decrease in the cost of sequencing an individual's entire genome, genomic clinical research is continuously expanding.' This fact, coupled with the increasing size of trial enrollments, creates an enormous amount of genetic.data, 2 which often ends up in
biobanks to be used continuously in anonymized genomic research. 3 This
increase is accompanied by more complex questions of how to conduct ethical research due to incidental findings, such as unanticipated genetic discoveries that are found during the course of research, but fall beyond the aim of the
study.4 For example, suppose a researcher is conducting a study investigating
the genetic differences in metabolizing enzymes. During the study, she discovers genetic variations in ten percent of her subjects that, in a recent publi-

1. See Moira A. Keane, InstitutionalReview BoardApproaches to the Incidental Findings Problem,
36 J. L. MED. & ETHics 352, 352 (2008) (finding that technological advances have caused genomic research to expand so rapidly that it has outpaced existing infrastructure and ethical and
regulatory guidance). See also Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethicaland PracticalGuidelinesfor Repoting
Genetic Research Results to Study Particants:Updated Guidelinesfrom a National Heart, Lung, and Blood
Institute Working Group, 3 CIRCUlATION: CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 575 (2010) (describing the change in genetics due to high-throughput technologies, whole genome sequencing,
and the data sharing among researchers); Vardit Ravitsky & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Disclosing
IndividualResults to Research Partidaants,6 AM. J. BIOETHICs 8, 8 (2006) (attributing part of the
expansion to a shift in research from rare diseases to the contribution of genetics in common
diseases such as cancer and heart disease).
2. Juli Murphy et al., Pubc Expectationsfor Return of Results from large-Cohort Genetic Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHIcs 36, 36 (2008). See also Bartha Maria Knoppers & Emmanuelle Lvesque, Introduction: Return of Research Results: How Should Research Results Be Handled?, 39 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 574, 574 (2011) (discussing the "information tsunami" that has been created by
next generation sequencing).
3. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing IncidentalFindings and Research Results in Genomic Research
Involving Biobanks andArchived DataSets, 14 GE:NETICS IN ME-D. 361, 361 (2012).
4. Susan M. Wolf, Introduction: The Challenge of Incidental Findings, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
216, 217 (2008).
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cation, have been connected with a twenty percent increase in the chance of
developing colorectal cancer.5 Whether researchers should disclose such incidental findings is but one ethical quandary that comes with the growth of
genomic research. 6
In the ongoing debate over whether to return incidental findings to individual subjects, a critical piece of the puzzle that is often overlooked is the
issue of resources and the role they should play in determining a researcher's
obligation to disclose individual results. This commentary seeks to fill this
void by demonstrating the criticality of resources in the ethical determination
of researcher obligations. Nearly every author addressing the subject has discussed at length whether results should be returned, yet, the dilemma of how
to accomplish this with limited resources is frequently raised, but rarely discussed in a substantive manner.7 In an era where rising costs and resource

5. This scenario is an adaptation of one found in the following article: Meredith C.
Meacham et al., Researcher Perspectives on Disclosure of Incidental Findings in Genetic Research, 5 J.
EMPiluCAL RES. ON HUM. REs. ETHICs 31, 32 (2010). See general# Jennifer Couzin-Frankel,
What Would You Do?, 331 Sci. 662 (2011) (describing various real-life situations of researchers
disclosing genomic results to subjects, the reactions that occur, and the thought process of the
researchers).
6. See Annelien L. Bredenoord et al., Disclosure of Indiidual Genetic Data to Research Participants: The Debate Reconsidered,27 TRENDs IN GENETICs 41, 41 (2011) (discussing the rapid developments in next - generation sequencing technology and the resulting increase in incidental
findings).
7. See, e.g., Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of
Genomics Research, 14 GENEIMCS INMED. 473, 475 (2012) ("[Closts should be taken into account
in deciding what to return."); Bredenoord et al., supra note 6, at 43 ("[Fleedback on all useful
results would be extraordinarily costly in time and money."); Laura M. Beskow & Wylie Burke,
Offering Indiidual Genetic Research Results: Context Matters, 2 Sci. TRANSIATIONAL MED. 1, 4 (2010)
("In some contexts, the rationale for providing individual results is insufficient to justify spending scarce research resources to do so."); Meacham et al., supra note 5, at 38 ("[Ujnresolved
issues include the funding of professional genetic counselors and the appropriate strategies and
resources for the return of genetic results."); Lisa S. Parker, The Future of Incidental Findings:
Should They be Viewed as Benefits?, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 341, 345 (2008) (noting "the reality of
limited resources to expend on research") [hereinafter Parker, Future of Inddental Findings];
Franklin G. Miller, Michelle M. Mello & Steve Joffe, InddentalFindngsin Human Subjects Research:
What Do Investigators Owe Research Particjeants?, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 271, 278 (2008)
("[R]esearchers should consider the opportunity costs of investing resources .");
Michelle N.
Meyer, The Kindness of Strangers: The Donative Contract Between Subjects and Researchers and the NonObkgation to Return Indiidual Results of Genetic Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICs 44, 45 (2008)
("[Rieturning individual results in an ethical manner can be costly. . . ."); Conrad V. Fernandez
& Charles Weijer, Obligations in Offering to Disclose Genetic Research Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHics 44,
45 (2006) ("The issue of the cost of disclosure of research results is surely important in an era
of restricted research resources . .. ."); Robert Klitzman, Puestions, Comvplexities, and limitadons in
Disclosing Indiidual Genetic Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICs 34, 35 (2006) ('[Rlesearch resources are
limited . . . .").
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allocation is debated in nearly every aspect of health care, it is shocking to find
the same discussion absent in the context of genomic research. 8
Clear guidance must be issued to aid Institutional Review Boards
("IRBs") in understanding what to require, to guide researchers in identifying
what their obligations are, and to provide subjects with the knowledge of what
to expect.9 Recent studies have shown that with no national policy to guide
them, IRBs are conflicted about how to incorporate this newly expanding
ethical obligation to individual subjects, especially since "the expectation for
individual benefit is antithetical to the traditional concept of research." 0 Calls
for broad obligations have largely ignored the essential elements of research,
voluntary enrollment for the pursuit of generalizable knowledge, and the resources needed to fulfill each study's goal. The practicality of limited research
resources demands that an ethical justification be provided for diverting these
resources to individual subjects rather than answering the scientific question
for which the study was created."
As this commentary will demonstrate, the conundrum of returning results under the constraints of limited resources can only be solved by the duty
to rescue principle. Unlike other contributions to the literature, this paper is
the first to anchor a duty to disclose individual results in the duty to rescue
alone. 12 By doing so, this paper finds not only an ethical solution to justify the
disclosure of individual results that fits within the established research ethics
paradigm, but it resolves the resource predicament as well. The duty to rescue
creates not only an ethical floor of what must be returned, but also a ceiling of
the amount of resources that may be utilized to fulfill this duty, thereby ensuring that individuals are protected without jeopardizing the production of generalizable knowledge.
The duty to rescue arises in genomic research when "an investigator discovers genetic information that clearly indicates a high probability of a serious
condition for which an effective intervention is readily available."' 3 Even
8. See generall Clayton & McGuire, spra note 7, at 475 ("[Imhe Centers for Disease Control and Prevention decided not to proceed with genetic research in the National Health and
Nutrition Examination Survey III in part because the cost of obtaining adequate consent was
estimated to be in the millions of dollars.").
9. Wolf, supra note 4, at 217.
10. Lynn G. Dressler et al., IRB Perspective on the Return of Individual Results from Genomic
Research, 14 GENETICS IN MED. 215, 221 (2012).
11. See Erica K. Rangel, The Management of Incidental Findings in Neuro-Imaging Research:
Framework and Recommendations, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 117, 120 (2010) (discussing the importance of evaluating how much human and financial resources ought to be devoted to fulfilling a potential obligation to return individual results).
12. This paper does not claim to be the first to suggest a duty to rescue as an underlying
ethical justification for returning individual results. See Beskow & Burke, supra note 7, at 2
(applying the duty to rescue to certain situations that arise in genomic research). However, this
paper does not alter a rescue-based approach by merging it with the unsettled ethical principles
of ancillary care, which focuses on the researcher-subject relationship. Id at 1.
. 13. Beskow & Burke, supra note 7, at 2.
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those opposing a broad obligation to return individual results often find a
duty to disclose certain information that would qualify as life-saving or severe-morbidity-preventing. 14 In fact, the duty to disclose when it could save
the life of a subject is almost universally accepted; therefore, any discussion
moving forward should really focus on what other results should be disclosed.' 5 This commentary does just that, while providing the first detailed
explanation of how a duty to rescue provides not only an ethical justification
for a minimum disclosure that researchers must meet, but also a limit to the
amount of resources that may be devoted to returning individual results as
well. The ceiling in the rescue doctrine is present to make certain the study
and its goal of producing generalizable knowledge are protected while simultaneously preventing harm to individual subjects that can be mitigated. Thus,
this rescue-based approach is the first to bound an obligation with a minimum
and maximum, which provides a more comprehensible understanding of duties to disclose and the role resources play.
In examining the principles of ethical research, it becomes clear that the
current landscape pushing for a broad obligation eschews the traditional research framework. Furthermore, the argument to extend researcher obligations seems to focus on ethics as they relate to individual subjects, while ignoring the fact that the pursuit of the overall research goal imposes its own
ethical obligations that cannot be discounted. Part I frames the resource
problem by elucidating just how resource intensive the fulfilling of a broad
obligation to disclose individual results will be. In Part II, the principles of
ethical research are examined to illustrate that a broad obligation diverges
from the established ethical paradigm and that current approaches disregard
the resources necessary to fulfill such a broad duty. Additionally, this part will
demonstrate that the duty to rescue is the only principle that provides a justification for a duty to disclose that fits within the standard research ethics.
Finally in Part III, the duty to rescue becomes the focus of a narrow obligation that appropriately highlights and ethically manages the role of resources
in research. This part will show that the duty to disclose can be found in traditional ethical principles and that it appropriately balances the resources required to protect individual subjects from preventable harm with the ethical
obligation to conduct rigorous research to produce generalizable knowledge.
I. FRAMING THE RESOURCE PROBLEM
Despite its consistent recognition as an important factor to consider
when discussing obligations of disclosure, the role of resources has yet to be
fully addressed. Still, the inescapable reality is that there is not an endless
supply of staff, money, or time to address every research subject's preferences
while, at the same time, completing the study's protocol. With limited re14.
15.

Id. at 2 (internal citations omitted).
Bredenoord et al., supra note 6, at 45.
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sources, decisions must be made on how to best allocate them in the research
setting. Research ethics demand that individual subjects be protected while
the researcher carries out their obligation to pursue generalizable knowledge.1 6
In keeping with the protection of individual subjects, the provision of individual results must be done in an ethical manner. At a minimum, appropriate
disclosure requires that adequate resources are available for the following:
determining clinical validity and relevance, confirming analytic validity,
providing genetic counseling prior to informed consent, re-contacting subjects, and supplying genetic counseling prior to and after disclosure."
Determining the clinical validity of an incidental finding is necessary to
avoid the harm of conveying unsubstantiated and possibly misleading data.18
However, this process will undoubtedly prove difficult and time-consuming, if
not impossible, given our relatively nascent understanding of the contribution
of genotype to certain diseases and the fact that those genotypic variants that
qualify as clinically relevant may change from year to year.' 9 Meanwhile, attaining "analytic validity" requires that results be verified in a CLIA-certified
lab-which most research labs are not-before they can be returned to individual research subjects. 20
To provide adequate informed consent, genetic counselors are necessary
to ensure subjects understand the nature of the study and the research procedures and comprehend the potential benefits and harms of receiving genetic

16. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BEI.MONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINEs FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESiEARCH, 5 A (1979) (emphasizing

the importance of ethical review to ensure protect subjects while generalizable knowledge is
sought) lhereinafter BELMONT REPORT].

17. See Laura M. Beskow, Considering the Nature of Individual Research Results, 6 AM. J.
BIOvTHIcs 38, 38-40 (2006).
18. Id at 39. Disclosing results that have not been satisfactorily verified becomes increasingly unethical given the possibility of a therapeutic misconception being present in many of the
subjects. See also Mildred K. Cho, UnderstandingIncidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and
Genomics, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 284-85 (2008).
19. See Flavia M. Facio, One Site Does Not Fit All, 6 AM. J. BioETHICs 40, 41 (2006) (describing our knowledge about contributions of genetics to disease as rudimentary and assessing
clinical validity as a moving target); Kelly E. Ormond, Disclosing Genetic Research Results: Examples
from Practice, 6 Am. J. BIOETHIcs 30, 30-31 (2006) (discussing how a causal gene identified in
research may be years away from being verified through clinical testing or the possibility of an
overestimation of genotypes leading to phenotypes because the conclusion was based on small
or single studies); Klitzman, supra note 7, at 35 (discussing the possibility of later studies to
confirm or invalidate earlier iesults).
20. Fernandez & Weijer, supra note 7, at 45. See also Ellen Wright Clayton, IncidentalFindings
in Genetics Research UsingArchived DNA, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 290 (2008). Paying to have
results verified in a CLIA-certified lab can place a financial burden on certain studies. Fernandez & Weijer, supranote 7, at 45. See also Klitzman, supra note 7, at 35 ("Ilests through Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA)-certified labs can also be expensive.").

Rsource Restraints: Rethinking Disclosure of IndividualGenomic Findings

133

information. 21 Yet, genetic counselors are often quite expensive due to being
in such short supply.22 Re-contacting subjects is necessary because informed
consent is an ongoing process and over the course of a lengthy study the factors in one's life that influence their decision to receive or not receive certain
results may have changed.2 However, the task of re-contacting subjects can
be costly, time-consuming, and in some circumstances virtually impossible. 24
Finally, a round of genetic counseling is necessary prior to and after disclosure
to ensure the subject understands the ramifications or receiving results, still
wishes to receive them, and is able to cope with the information once it is
received. 25
The costs of these steps cannot be understated and they may not be the
only ethical requirements for which resources are necessary. For example,
these listed requirements do not even include the fact that once the return of
individual results becomes customary, obligations of ancillary care and researcher liability may follow. Ancillary care duties may stem from the inability
of certain subjects to attain follow-up care, whether because of difficulty in
21. See Fernandez & Weijer, supra note 7, at 45 (stating that fulfilling an obligation to
return individual results requires expertise in communicating genetic information); Keane, supra
note 1, at 354 (finding genetic counselors a requirement under respect for persons); Ormond,
supra note 19, at 32 (stating that genetic specialists must be included in the study design).
22. Klitzman, supra note 7, at 35. The cost of utilizing these counselors could be greater if
the obligation to return results extends to include subjects' preferences. See Cho, supra note 18,
at 283 (discussing the need for researchers to ascertain subject preferences about what information they would like to receive due to respect for persons, and that the process should be
conducted during the informed consent process). Another aspect that may add to this timeconsuming task is the potential duty to consider and mitigate third party or group harms. See
Beskow, supra note 17, at 38 (finding beneficent obligations of a favorable risk-benefit ratio
extend beyond individuals to include potential harms to communities); Meyer, supra note 7, at
45 (describing the potential for extended obligations of researchers due to the familial nature of
genetic research).
23. See Lisa S. Parker, Best Laid Plansfor Offeing Results Go Awry, 6 AM.J. BIOETHICS 22, 22
(2006) ("What individuals prefer when presented with actual choices, in various contexts including those involving acquisition of genetic risk information, frequently differs from their
initial choice.") [hereinafter Parker, Best Laid Plans]; Ormond, supra note 19, at 31
("[P]articipants may be more likely to desire genetic test results in a hypothetical versus actual
setting . . . ."); Facio, supra note 19, at 41 ("It will be crucial to learn if such preferences hold in
the face of a real versus a hypothetical opportunity to learn results.").
24. See Klitzman, supra note 7, at 35 ("[Logistical and financial obstacles can impede contacting study participants . . . ."); Christopher H. Wade & Andrea L. Kalfoglou, When Do Genetic
Researchers Have a Duty to Recontact Study Particioants?,6 AM.J. BIoETHICS 26, 27 (2006) (asserting
the costly requirement of recontact due to the impossibility of predicting every type of information that may become available and finding cost to be an insufficient excuse for a researcher
to avoid recontacting subjects).
25. This round of genetic counseling may require more intensive work due to the effects
of the results. See Parker, Best laidPlans, supra note 23, at 22 ("Subjects' decisions about receiving individualized genetic results open them to receiving information that may more directly
and substantially affect their physical, psychological, social, and economic well-being, and that
of their relatives.").
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accessing care or an inability to afford the requisite next steps. 26 This makes
sense, as it hardly seems appropriate to provide genetic information to a subject if they lack the capacity to utilize it in any meaningful manner. Nevertheless, for a researcher, the investigation of the financial capabilities of each
subject is yet another resource-intensive task that they must complete. 27
Meanwhile, the potential downstream cost of researcher liability could
evolve from creating an ethical duty to return individual results. 28 One of the
primary purposes for distinguishing between the obligations owed to individuals by researchers from those owed by physicians is to avoid the potential for
malpractice claims. 29 However, expanding researcher responsibilities to individual subjects has the potential to begin dismantling this distinction, as subjects may begin demanding more and more control over their information
obtained by the researcher. If researchers fail to provide the correct information or the necessary follow-up care, they may be subjected to malpractice
lawsuits, which would assuredly raise the cost of doing business. 30
With all of this is mind, there are some who believe that, despite the resources needed to fulfill an obligation ethically, "offering disclosure of research results is a moral obligation, [and] the cost of doing so is not a mitigating factor."3' On the other hand, others take the view that, even if a moral
26. Compare Brian Van Ness, Genomic Research and Incidental.Findings,36J. L. MIED. & ETHICS
292, 296 (2008) ("While recommendations for further testing may be made, the researcher
should not bear the financial responsibility."), nith Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 1, at 13 (stating that if a subject does not have the ability to obtain clinically useful results outside of the

study then the researcher has an obligation to develop the capabilities to provide the necessary
services even if it means diverting resources from the research objective). See also Rangel, supra
note 11, at 123 (raising the question of whether a research team is financially obligated to provide follow-up care if a subject does not have the means to do so on their own).
27. See Parker, Best Laid Plans, supranote 23, at 23 ("[Mlost investigators will not know the
financial circumstances or insurance provisions of their subjects."); Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra
note 1, at 14 ("[P]articipants must have the ability to pay for testing and counseling elsewhere.').
28. See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 7, at 475 ("fjIf guidelines suggest there is an ethical
obligation to offer results and investigators adopt this practice widely, both could be used as
evidence of what is the standard of care for investigators.").
29. Leslie A. Meltzer, Undesirable Implicaions of Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research
Partiipants,6 AM.J. BIOITHIcs 28, 29 (2006).
30. See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 7, at 473 ("[B]roader return of results will unjustifiably become standard of care based on growing 'consensus' in the literature, which may risk
creation of a legal (negligence-based) duty to offer and return individualized genetic research
results.").
31. Fernandez & Weijer, supra note 7, at 45. See also Robert R. Lavieri & Samuel A. Garncr, Ethical Considerationsin the Communication of Unexpected Information ith Cnical Implcaions, 6
Am. J. BiolnHics 46, 47 (2006) ("[Just because an action is expensive does not negate it as a
moral consideration."); Wade & Kalfoglou, supra note 24, at 27 ("Cost alone is an insufficient
reason not to recontact research participants . . . ."); David I. Shalowitz & Franklin G. Miller,
DisclosingIndividual Results of Clinical Research: Implications of Rerpedtfor Participants,294 J. AM. MID.
Ass'N 737, 739 (2005) (stating that costs burdening already strained research budgets and making future studies more difficult should not obviate researchers' obligations).
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obligation exists, "the practicalities of returning results may impose untenable
burdens on the existing research infrastructure." 32 However, as both sides
recognize that an ethical obligation is present, this disagreement simply points
to the fact that the discourse on returning individual results must move from
the mere existence of an ethical duty, to answering whether the identified obligation can justify the resources needed to dispense this duty. A duty to return individual results may be outweighed by resource factors, especially if a
researcher's time and resources are limited and those available resources
would be better utilized addressing the important research questions of the
researcher, in the hope of creating societal benefits.33
It is also important to note that when an ethical obligation among researchers is defined, a floor is being created which all researchers must meet.
While articles often distinguish obligations found in bench research from biobanks, 34 the reality is that when a bar is set for an ethical obligation to return
results, it applies to research along the spectrum. Examining a potential obligation in terms of resources then makes it clear that an overly expansive duty
can become crippling to certain types research. As the researcher becomes
further removed from the subject, the difficulty in meeting a requirement to
return individual results increases exponentially, as do the resources required
to fulfill that obligation.35 For example, a push for increased privacy rights
through de-identification is diametrically opposed to an expanding ethical
obligation for biobank researchers to provide individual results and increases
the resources required to do so. Therefore, maintaining focus on the resource
requirements that invariably accompany any duty will assist in defining an
appropriate floor for an obligation for all researchers.
II.

REEXAMINING ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
INCIDENTAL FINDINGS

The primary goal of ethical clinical research is to develop or contribute
generalizable knowledge; 36 therefore, individuals participate in research for the

32. Pilar N. Ossorio, letting the Gene Out of the Bottle: A Comment on Returning Indididual
Research Results to Partiiants,6 AM.J. BIOETHICs 24, 25 (2006).
33. Paul Affleck, Is it Ethicalto Deny Genetic Research ParticiantsIndiidualResults?, 35 J. Mim.
ETHICs 209, 212 (2009).
34. See, e.g., Wolf et al., supra note 3, at 361 (distinguishing the discussion about obligations
of biobanks from that of other genomic research).
35. See Wade & Kalfoglou, supra note 24, at 27 (discussing the resources required for
recontacting subjects and the burden it places on the study).
36. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, David Wendler, & Christine Grady, What Makes Cinical Research
Ethical?, 283 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2701, 2701 (2000) ("The overarching objective of clinical research is to develop generalizable knowledge to improve health and/or increase understanding
of human biology... ."). See also BELMONT REPORT, supra note 16.
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betterment of society, not to promote their own individual medical needs. 37
This is not to say that the rights and wellbeing of the individual participants
are inconsequential. Indeed, research must be conducted such that subjects
can contribute without fear of being exploited or misused. To this end, the
ethical principles that govern clinical research are there to ensure that guidelines are in place to protect the individual while the study goal is simultaneously being pursued. 38 To move from a focus on protecting subjects to creating
positive obligations toward individuals there must be an ethical justification.
Therefore, in the context of limited resources, the question is whether the
ethical principle underlying a duty to disclose validates the tradeoff of diverting resources away from the study objective toward individual benefits. A
look at current ethical analysis finds a dearth of appropriate justification for a
broad obligation.
A. Autonomy/Respect for Persons
A respect for persons requires the acknowledgement that individuals
should be treated as autonomous agents, 39 which, at a minimum, allows for
people to make their own choices free from interference and limitations by
others.40 In terms of clinical research, respect for autonomy is exhibited
through informed consent and the ability of subjects to withdraw from the
trial at any time. 41 As the requirement of informed consent is ongoing, it requires researchers to keep the subject abreast of relevant study information
that may affect their decision to remain enrolled. Protecting autonomy includes ascertaining the subject's desire for information once it is available
because during the time between the initial informed consent and disclosure
of results, a substantial part of an individual's life affecting their decisions and
preferences may have changed. 42
The notion that respect for persons and their autonomy requires the disclosure of individual results is largely based on the fact that it allows individuals access to their information and thereby facilitates more informed decisionmaking. 43 Yet, even if it were possible to accurately and efficiently determine
37. See BEiMONT REPORT, supra note 16, § A (distinguishing between clinical practice,
which refers to interventions to enhance an individual's well-being, and clinical research).
38. See id. (stating that while the pursuit of generalizable knowledge is the purpose of
clinical research, ethical review is necessary to protect participating subjects).
39. Id. § B(1).
40. ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMEs F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics 58
(Oxford University Press, 5th ed. 2001).
41. Emanuel, Wendler, & Grady, supra note 36, at 2706-07.
42. See Klitzman, supra note 7, at 35 ("[I ndividuals may change their views and priorities
concerning genetic information ... ."); Parker, Best Laid Plans, supra note 23, at 23 ("[Diuring or
following a study, the information on which participants had based their decisions about learning genetic information may change.").
43. See, e.g., Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 1, at 9 ("Respect for participants requires that
investigators provide results that may be of interest to participants . .. ."). Some argue that this
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the preferences of all individual subjects related to receiving genetic results,
this does not equate to a moral requirement to actually abide by those preferences." Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests it may not be possible for a
subject to accurately understand and convey what their preferences would be
given the complexities of genetic information and the differences between
theoretically receiving results and actually receiving them. 45
The potential for personal preferences of an individual subject to alter a
researcher's study plan or to divert time and energy away from the primary
research objective seems contrary to the goal of research and the justification
for subject enrollment. However, it would be unethical for a researcher to
attempt to conserve resources by disclosing results that have not been appropriately validated simply due to a subject's desire to have them.46 Additionally,
to acquiesce to subjects' preferences will undeniably further subjects' therapeutic misconception by supporting the notion that participating in studies
can and should provide personal benefits. 47 This may jeopardize subjects'
ability to provide truly informed consent, the primary method of protecting
subject autonomy. As such, autonomy cannot be maintained as a justification
for adhering to subjects' preferences.
B. Beneficence
The principle of beneficence refers to "a moral obligation to act for the
benefit of others," thereby furthering important and legitimate interests. 48 For
those with a moral obligation of beneficence, a positive duty is created to act
on another's behalf and in their best interest. Yet, since any positive action is
unlikely to be conducted without some counteracting risk or cost, to be appropriately beneficent an action must produce an amount of benefits that
warrant those consequential risks or costs. 49 It is this balance that helps to
bring focus to the blurry line between an actual obligation and merely a moral
ideal.50
requires the return of all material information to study subjects. Keane, supra note 1, at 354.
Meanwhile, others state that researchers must determine what information to disclose based on
each subject's personal values, preferences, and circumstances. Parker, Best Laid Plans, supra
note 23, at 23.
44. See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 7, at 474 ("even if participants' authentic preferences could be assessed and participants want results, it does not follow that investigators must
offer them ... participant demand is not, in itself, sufficient to warrant offering results in the
research context"); Meyer, supra note 7, at 45 (stating that even if there is reliable evidence that
subjects prefer individual results, this does not on its own create a moral obligation).
45. See supra note 21.
46. Clayton & McGuire, supranote 7, at 474.
47. Id. at 474.
48. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 40, at 166.
49. Id.
50. See id.at 167 (finding that we are not morally required to do all acts that would benefit
others on all occasions even if we are in a position to do so). Additionally, beneficence is typi-
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The application of a moral obligation of beneficence to clinical research
is traditionally satisfied with a favorable risk-benefit ratio.51 In other words,
the research's potential benefits to the subjects and society must outweigh the
risks involved in conducting the trial. 52 A determination of satisfying the required obligation of beneficence is conducted by an IRB by examining the
ratio before any subjects are enrolled and the potential for harm occurs. 53
However, despite some claims to the contrary, beneficence does not demand
that the preferences of the subject be taken into consideration, as this claim is
more appropriately linked to, and proven unnecessary, in terms of autonomy. 54 And while beneficence does require a weighing of benefits against the
potential harms, these include benefits to society and do not guarantee benefits to individual subjects. 5 Therefore, insisting that beneficence itself supports a duty of disclosure to all individual subjects continues to blur the line
between physician and researcher and insinuates to enrollees that the researcher must be acting in their best interest.56
Moreover, it is debatable whether a specific piece of genetic information
will be deemed a benefit or harm.57 For example, knowledge of even a slight
increase in the chance of acquiring a certain disease, especially if no action can
be taken to mitigate the risk, may prove mentally trying for many. The potential to receive information that may not lead to any therapeutic value,58 whether it be because no action may be taken or they have no means available to
access clinical care, seems to be more accurately described as a harm than a
benefit. Furthermore, an offer of genetic results may imply to many participants that they would be unwise to refuse it, thereby leading them to accept
cally qualified in that it is not always accompanied by an insistence of impartiality; rather, we
can exhibit our beneficence to those with whom we have special relationships. Id. at 168. An
obligation of beneficence is not always eliminated simply due to a lack of a special relationship,
however, as demonstrated by a person's duty to rescue a stranger when there is minimal risk to
themselves, which is a legal requirement in some states. Id.
51. Emanuel, Wendler, & Grady, supra note 36, at 2705-06.
52. Id. at 2706. Assurance that benefits to participants and society are maximized while
potential harms are minimized also helps to alleviate the risk of unethically exploiting human
research subjects. Id.
53. See Leslie A. Meltzer, Undesirable Implications of Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research Participants,6 AM.

J.

BIOETHICS 28, 28 (2006) (stating that beneficence is determined ab

initio).
54. See BiEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESs, supra note 40, at 176 (finding that beneficence does not
require the best interests of the subject be connected to their preferences since autonomy sufficiently addresses this).
55. Keane, supranote 1, at 352.
56. Clayton & McGuire, supra note 7, at 474.
57. Wolf, supra note 4, at 217. While there is data to suggest individuals find benefit in
their individual results and the stress from receiving this information is low, "these data are
based on studies involving highly self-selected individuals undergoing genetic testing for rare
conditions with a strong hereditary component." Facio, supra note 19, at 41.
58. See Cho, supra note 18, at 282 (discussing the possibility that potential benefits of genetic research may be informational rather than therapeutic).
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the disclosure even though they may not have wanted or actively sought the
information.5 9 This has led some to suggest that beneficence may actually
demand that results should not even be offered. 60
This task of subjectively determining what constitutes an appropriate risk
6
given certain benefits is one of the IRBs' most challenging duties. With the
realistic possibility that no significantly useful individual results will be obtained, IRBs must find adequate benefits regardless of what individual results
may arise. 62 Therefore, beneficence cannot be said to require the disclosure of
incidental findings. Moreover, the potential for IRBs to erroneously consider
the possibility of receiving individual results as a benefit, and thereby, approving inappropriately risky studies, presents a risk that is not worth taking.63
C. Justice
Justice is a concept that is concerned with the appropriate distribution of
the benefits and burdens of the research being conducted.64 The primary
objective is to ensure that subjects be selected such that the groups and individuals who are burdened with the risks are in the best position to also enjoy
the benefits. 65 Justice is also focused on equal access to participation in research trials and access to the results of the research. 66 Therefore, justice is
typically thought to require a fair selection in subjects for a clinical trial.67
While justice has been claimed to require a balancing of subject preferences with considerations of utilizing resources to maximize the benefit to
society, 68 it is not apparent from where this ethical theory is derived, since
individual preference is sufficiently addressed by autonomy. Justice is more
59. Parker, Best Laid Plans, supra note 23, at 23. See also Clayton & McGuire, supra note 7,
at 473 ("[I]t is difficult to imagine that very many people would say 'no' when asked whether
they would want information that another person has about them.").
60. Affleck, supra note 33, at 210.
61. Keane, supra note 1, at 353.
62. Meltzer, supra note 53, at 28.
63. See Dressler et al., supra note 10, at 220 (stating the knowledge and expertise needed to
appropriately analyze these issues and the lack of national guidance which IRBs may rely on to
make decisions).
64. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 16, § B(3). This concept is also sometimes referred to
as distributive justice, which accounts for "fair, equitable, and appropriate distribution determined by justified norms that structure the terms of social cooperation." BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 40, at 226.
65. Emanuel, Wendler, & Grady, supra note 36, at 2705. See also BELMONT REPORT, supra
note 16, § B(3) (providing counter examples that include early research where poor ward patients were used to benefit medical care for private patients; prisoners in Nazi concentration
camps; and the Tuskegee syphilis study of the 1940s).
66.

BEAUCHAMP & CHILDREsS, supra note 40, at 227.

67. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 16, § C(3). The basis for subject selection must be the
scientific goals of the study, rather than factors such as convenience, vulnerability, or privilege.
Emanuel, Wendler, & Grady, supra note 36, at 2704.
68. Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 1, at 9-10.
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appropriately concerned with the overall benefits and burdens rather than
those potentially experienced by each individual subject. Furthermore, this
characterization of justice appears to not only step back from requiring the
return of individual results, but it seems to concede that such a return is, in

fact, in direct competition with the resources required to fulfill research's primary goal of benefiting society.
D. Nonmaleficence
While some have conflated the concept of nonmaleficence with that of
beneficence, there is a clear distinction that separates the two. 69 Nonmaleficence is an obligation not to inflict harm on others, meaning it restricts conduct based on its impact on others, whereas beneficence morally obligates
certain actions for the benefit of others. 70 Therefore, nonmaleficence is a
negative duty, while beneficence is a positive one. Due to the fact that nonmaleficence has yet to be persuasively argued to require any positive duties,
the claim of obligations to individuals cannot be founded in this ethical principle.
E. Reciprocity
Reciprocity is the obligation to make an appropriate or proportional return of benefits to research subjects due to the benefits researchers and their
studies receive from subjects' voluntary participation. 7' However, the most
glaring argument against reciprocity requiring the return of individual results is
the mere fact that reciprocity does not require any specific type of benefit to
subjects. 72 Reciprocity simply demands that the subjects receive something in
return for their participation. 73 The obligation may be satisfied by any number
of benefits, including monetary compensation, aggregate study results, access
to medication, or merely gaining access to care they would be unable to receive outside of the study.74
Given the fact that returning individual results may not be a benefit to all
who receive them and it may harm others by diverting research resources to
select individuals, reciprocity seems like an unsound justification to require
69. Tom Beauchamp, The Principles ofBeneficence in Applied Ethics, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. 1,
6 (2008), availableat http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/principle-beneficence/.
70. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 40, at 113-15.
71. See id. at 174 (accepting the account of reciprocity delivered by David Hume). A researcher's duty to fulfill reciprocal obligations may be even higher than in other social instances
due to the fact that benefits received are easily traceable to identifiable persons, the research
subjects. Maria Merritt & Christine Grady, Reamdy and Post-TrialAccessfor Partiapants in AntiretroviralsTherapy Trialr, 20 AIDS 1791, 1792 (2006).
72. Meltzer, supra note 53, at 28.
73. Id
74. Id. at 29.
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such an obligation.75 Reciprocity can only demand benefits reflective of their
contribution to others; therefore, individual subjects cannot be afforded benefits that would in actuality diminish the benefits received by others.76 Consequently, reciprocity cannot ethically require a diversion of resources that significantly hinders achieving the ultimate study goal.77
Additionally, reciprocity is satisfied when all subjects receive something;78 a requirement that returning significant genetic information is unlikely
due to the uncertainty of whom, if anyone, will receive beneficial incidental
findings. This is why reciprocity can be satisfied in several ways, rather than
requiring one particular obligation.79 Furthermore, there are other methods
that may be utilized to recognize subject sacrifices without creating too large a
burden on the research.80 Allowing subjects to demand what the researcher is
obligated to provide them in return for their voluntary enrollment seems to
subvert the very nature of research, which is to enroll for the benefit of society rather than individual gains.8'
F. Duty to Rescue
Even if returning individual results fit within the ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, justice, and reciprocity, this does not mean that any of
these require it as an obligation. 82 The duty to rescue, however, may differ.
Duties of rescue arise when: (1) there is a risk of significant harm or loss of
life; the rescuer's action is needed to prevent the harm; (2) the rescuer's action
has a high probability of preventing the harm; (3) there is little risk of harm to
the rescuer; (4) and the benefit gained outweighs the potential risk to the rescuer.83 This duty is one that lies with all moral agents," and is distinct from

75. See Merritt & Grady, supra note 71, at 1793-94 (finding problems with the argument
that reciprocity requires post-trial access to antiretrovirals for subjects participating in developing countries because it can disproportionately burden others).
76. Joseph Millum, Post-TrialAccess to Aniretovirals: Who Owes What to Whom?, 25
BIOETHICS 145,151 (2011).
77. See id. ("[N]o one should be made worse off by fulfilling duties of reciprocity. This
follows from the point of reciprocity: it is an appropriate response to benefits received.").
78. See Meltzer, supra note 53, at 29 (discussing reciprocity requiring that if subjects receive
anything for participation, they all ought to receive it).
79. See Ossorio, supra note 32, at 24 (describing formal ceremonies, aggregate results, posttrial access, in-trial health care access, and addressing research the subject population is interested in as ways to address reciprocity).
80. See Meltzer, supra note 53, at 29.
81. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 45 (finding an apparent contradiction in specific requirements to recognize altruism in research participation).
82. Ossorio, supra note 32, at 24.
83. BEAUCHAMP& CHII.DRESS, supranote 40, at 171.
84. Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, TheAndllary-CareResponsibilitiesofMedical Researchers, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25, 26 (2004). See also Meyer, supra note 7, at 45 (stating that everyone has moral dutes of rescue, especially when they are in positions to help with minimal risks).
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beneficence, which includes acting for the benefit of another even if they are
not in need of assistance.85
The duty to rescue has already been applied to post-trial access to antiretroviral therapy ("ART"), 86 ancillary care, 87 and community-based public
health intervention research.88 But this commentary aims to appropriately
focus the ethical justification for disclosing individual results on rescue alone,
and utilize its framework as a means for clarifying what genetic information
qualifies for disclosure as well as what resources can be used for that disclosure. The application of rescue to genomic research presents its own unique
challenges that cannot be found in other areas of research.
Genomic research creates an interesting dilemma due to the difficulty in
determining which genetic variants necessarily create a risk of significant
harm89 such that the researcher's obligation to disclose arises from a duty to
rescue. Discovering the proverbial "ticking time bomb" would qualify; yet,
genetic variants are often associated with merely increased risk, rather than
providing a near certainty of a particular clinical outcome. 90 Genetic results
and the links between genotype and phenotype are often dependent on numerous genetic variants, penetrance, and environmental factors.9' Therefore,
it is unclear what percentage increase in the chance of acquiring a disease

equates to a clear and impending danger of harm such that rescue obligations
are triggered; although, the requirement that the rescuer's action prevent or
mitigate harm insists that actionability be present for a duty of rescue to
arise. 92
With very few positive duties to individual subjects under established research ethics, the duty to rescue appears to present the only clear ethical obligation to return individual results and it seems to impart a very narrow obligation. Others have used the duty to rescue merely as a starting point, complemented by ethical duties under the ancillary care framework. 93 The use of
85. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 40, at 168 (discussing the difference between
moral obligations to impartially follow rules of rescue and the ability to exhibit beneficence with
partiality when choosing who will benefit).
86. Millum, supranote 76, at 152.
87. Henry S. Richardson, Inddental Findings and Anillay-Care Obhgations, 36 J. L. ME1D. &
ETHICS 256, 261 (2008).
88. Maria W. Merritt, Holly A. Taylor, & Luke C. Mullany, Andllay Care in Community-Based Public Health Intervention Research, 100 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 211, 212 (2010).
89. See Facio, supranote 19, at 41 (discussing the lack of understanding about the contributions of genetics to disease).
90. See, e.g., Parker, Best Laid Plans, supra note 23, at 23 (describing pleitropy, which is the
association of multiple traits or conditions with a genetic mutation, and how this may provide
some information on multiple disease risks rather than definitive or significant information on a
singular illness).
91. . Ormond, supra note 19, at 31.
92. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRIESS, supra note 40, at 171 (finding that for duties of rescue
to arise the rescuer's actions must have a high probability of preventing the harm).
93. Beskow & Burke, supranote 7, at 2.

Resource Restraints:Rethinking Disclosure of Individual Genomic Findings

143

ancillary care, which incorporates the context of the researcher-subject relationship, unnecessarily expands the obligations of researchers. Under this
framework, the relevance of resource limitations takes a backseat to the depth
of the researcher-subject relationship, which can push returning information
that would be at the researcher's discretion under the duty to rescue, to an
obligation under ancillary care. 94 Moreover, utilizing the ancillary care framework is unnecessary in the context of physician-scientists who discover pertinent information about their own patients during the course of research because the physician-patient relationship already affixes its own clinical ethical
obligations.95
This approach also needlessly conflates traditional ancillary care questions, whether to provide actual clinical care to someone in need, with the
provision of mere information. Disclosing genetic information to a research
subject is not the same as treating that subject's leg wound and should not be
placed under the same ethical paradigm. While it may be considered harsh to
cut off a duty to disclose an increased risk of acquiring certain diseases, there
is a distinct need to draw a line of obligations created by the duty to rescue.96
When examining a potential obligation through the lens of limited resources,
the need for a limited obligation becomes much clearer.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A DUTY To RESCUE STANDARD

The current trend suggesting there is an obligation to return individual
results in genomic research seems to circumvent the traditional ethical framework, which recognizes that research is meant to create generalizable
knowledge to benefit society and is not meant to seek the interests of the subjects participating.97 Therefore, it is essential to keep in mind that the goal of
producing generalizable knowledge is not merely an argument to be balanced
against that of the individual subject's rights, but rather it is the actual definition of research.98 After an ethical analysis of the roots of an obligation to
return individual results and examining the numerous resources required to
fulfill such a duty, it is apparent that the requirement placed on researchers
conducting genomic studies should remain limited.

94. Id. at 3.
95. Clayton & McGuire, supra note 7, at 474.
96. See Richardson & Belsky, supra note 84, at 261 (stating the importance of drawing a
line between cases creating a duty to rescue and those that do not, despite the controversy that
it may create).
97. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 44 ("[Bjy definition research seeks not to serve the interests
of participants but to create generalizable knowledge designed to benefit society and future
patients.").
98. Id. See also Beskow, supra note 17, at 38 (finding the production of generalizable
knowledge to be the definition of research).
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A. Sets a High Bar for Information to Return
The duty to rescue is different from other ethical justifications because
of its application to all moral agents.99 Its universal application means that
researchers are not simply targeted because they are seeking scientific discoveries or conducting research. Rather, they are merely placing themselves in a
position where they are much more likely than others to discover genetic variants and have the capability to prevent serious harm to that person. Consequently, the duty to rescue creates a floor of what researchers are required to
return, thereby ensuring that the resource excuse cannot be used to simply
avoid returning any results in a given study.
Duties of rescue arise when there is a risk of significant harm that can be
mitigated with minimal risk to the rescuer.1oo This eliminates an obligation to
return results that do not qualify as a significant risk of harm or that lack actionability. This distinguishes a rescue-based model from previously suggested models that incorporate variants related to non-harmful diseases or reproductive decision-making. By raising the bar on what requires action from the
researcher, it reduces the amount of resources that would be demanded by
obligating recontact and disclosure of, for example, a slight increase in the
chance to acquire arthritis due to a subject's stated preference to receive any
genetic information that is discovered.
Alternatively, a rescue-based approach to incidental findings distinguishes itself from other models because in addition to creating an ethical
floor, it is the only one that also creates a ceiling.'01 The duty to rescue does

not require someone to provide aid if it would endanger them, 102 creating a
necessary limit for what a person is ethically required to do. This limitation is
applicable in the research context as well, because an obligation of rescue cannot jeopardize the ability of the researcher to complete the study. The necessity for accurately identifying this limitation to an obligation to rescue is obvious when the factor of resources is adequately explored.
In terms of research, the duty to rescue must factor in the overall objective and the risks undertaken by all subjects to achieve that objective. This
goal cannot be sacrificed by redirecting resources necessary for study completion to the return of some individual results. With limited research resources,103 the demands of returning individual results, especially under an

99. Richardson & Belsky, supra note 84, at 26. See also Meyer, supranote 7, at 45.
100. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDREsS, supra note 40, at 171.
101. See, e.g.,Millum, supra note 76, at 152 (discussing the duty to rescue in terms of providing antiretroviral treatment in HIV/AIDS research and asserting that a duty to rescue can only
require treatment provided the cost was relatively low enough).
102. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 40, at 171 (stating that one of the elements
creating rescue obligations is that the rescuer's actions would provide little risk of harm to
themselves).
103. Klitzman, supra note 7, at 35.
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expansive obligation, could hinder the ability to complete studies as planned
and could be severely detrimental to the research industry.
The evolving technology of genomic research will certainly lead to an increase in incidental findings that are significant, but not necessarily clinically
relevant or actionable.'0 Therefore, keeping in mind the principal goal of
generalizable knowledge, it may be unethical to begin to offer individual results that make this primary objective more and more difficult to attain. 05
Consequently, the limiting principle found in the duty to rescue not only sets a
high bar for information that must be returned but it also restricts the resources that are allowed to be committed to returning individual results.
These limitations are essential in terms of protecting research in general and
the societal good it produces, as well as recognizing the reality of limited resources.
Anchoring an obligation to return individual results in the duty to rescue
essentially incorporates all of the necessary ethical considerations into one
guiding principle. Previous mentions of a rescue-based obligation have failed
to see this vital characteristic, emphasizing the researcher-subject relationship
from ancillary care models to elevate duties of disclosure for those researchers
who may maintain a physician-like relationship with their subjects. Yet, this
fails to appreciate that the duty to rescue grants that obligations may be enhanced by special relationships.10 6 As such, the relationship status that so
many seek to incorporate into duties of disclosure does not require any additional ethical framework. Again, this illustrates the beauty of utilizing the duty
to rescue's inherent obligation on anyone in a position to help, while allowing
for increases in obligations and preventing an overly and unethical expansion
that may jeopardize other important resource uses.
B. Creates a Safe Harbor for Research That Would be Unduly Burdened
With all of the good that has come from conducting research and all the
potential discoveries that lie in wait in genomic research it is vital that a suitable obligation to return individual results be clarified. The concern with the
current ethical basis for a broad duty to disclose creating a paradigm shift with
traditional research ethics is that this sets an obligation standard for all genomic studies.'07 It is imperative that attempts to distinctly outline the duties

104. Cho, supra note 18, at 281.
105. See Affleck, supra note 33, at 212 (finding it unethical to commit such resources to
returning individual results when they could be used for higher priorities).
106. Steven J. Heyman, Foundationsofa Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 751 (1994).
107. See Lynn G. Dressler & Eric T. Juengst, Thresholds and Boundaries in the Disclosure of
Individual Genetic Research Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 18, 19 (2006) (assessing the change to incorporate subjects' values and preferences with scientific determinants).
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of researchers keep in mind the effects such a standard may have on the various types and sizes of studies. 08
With a lack of clear reasoning for holding every study hostage with extensive duties of disclosure, the historic and accepted principles of ethical
research should not be altered.109 Meanwhile, the duty to rescue's inherent
requirement for balancing the benefits and harms of both sides of the equation creates a safe harbor for the types of research that would be unduly burdened by an obligation that encompasses too many resources. At the same
time, it places duties on those investigators who know of preventable harm
and have the resources to mitigate it.110

Assertion of a broad burden on researchers diverts resources from their
scientific objectives and has the chance of diminishing future research."'
Many genomic investigators do not think their role is analogous to the role of
a physician, with demanding ethical obligations toward individual subjects.112
As such, persisting with an emphasis for a broad obligation may have the unintended consequence of.encouraging more anonymized research where researchers feel their obligations to return individual results are extremely reduced, if not eliminated completely.13 Consequently, the supposed benefits
that many were seeking to provide to individual subjects could end up being
far less than if a more narrow duty was placed on researchers."14
The ease with which researchers can identify an incidental finding, understand its connection to a particular clinical outcome, and appropriately
address the finding to mitigate the harm is drastically overestimated." 5 There108. See Beskow, supra note 17, at 40 ("In deciding whether to offer results, it is both legitimate and imperative to assess not only individual risks and benefits, but also the risks and
benefits to the research enterprise, and thus to society at large.").
109. Fiona Alice Miller et al., Duty to Disclose What? Queying the Putative Obkgation to Return
Research Results to Partipants,34J. MED. ETHICs 210, 212 (2008).
110. Researchers are also free to go beyond the minimum disclosure requirements if doing
so does not jeopardize the chief research objective. See supra Part III.A (explaining that a rescue-based model creates a floor and ceiling of obligations that researchers are free to work
within).
111. See, eg., Judy Illes & Vivian Nora Chin, Bridging Philosophical and PracticalImpfications of.
Incidental Findings in Brain Research, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 298, 303 (2008) (insisting that if
researchers are laid with the financial burdens of follow-up care from incidental findings it may
discourage future funding for brain imaging research).
112. Kelly Fryer-Edwards & Stephanie M. Fullerton, Relationships uth Test-Tubes: Where's the
Red mdly?, 36 AM.J. BIOETHICs 36, 37 (2006).
113. Id.
114. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 46 (discussing the possibility of researchers who are unable
or unwilling to meet the demands of an expansive obligation simply conducting less research).
115. Genomic research is not imaging research. Research scans can reveal obvious abnormalities even to an untrained reader, possibly presenting a more clinically concrete problem
than a genetic variant. See Clayton, supra note 20, at 290 (emphasizing the difference between
genomic and imaging research). Therefore, it is important to clearly distinguish these two
realms of incidental findings to ensure that a broad obligation in one does not inevitably create
a broad obligation in the other. Id.
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fore, the effects that a broad obligation has on each study support maintaining
a limited obligation toward individual subjects, but the broader implications
for the research industry do as well." 6 Insisting that researchers have this
obligation carries with it a substantial burden on the funders who must consider the budgets of several studies at one time." 7 Putting more resources
into returning individual results wiH undoubtedly lead to fewer studies, less
subjects being enrolled, and less scientific questions being answered.
A reasonable understanding of the ethical principles of research and the
realities of limited resources implore an appropriate balance between the protection of individual subjects and the less frequently discussed protection of
the research enterprise.' 18 It is possible that given the choice between returning individual results in general or conducting more research, volunteers may
reveal a change in their preferences."' With a greater understanding of the
impact on societal health that research has had, and how the future benefits
may be significantly reduced due to requirements owed to a small percentage
of subjects, those volunteering to create broad benefits may find an expansive
obligation to return individual results less appealing.120
C. Limits the Resources Required to Fulfill a Duty to Disclose
A rescue approach identifies an understandable ethical foundation that
more precisely delineates for researchers their obligations for devoting their
time and resources to processes that fall outside of their study goals. A clearer
picture of what findings researchers must address-those presenting substantial harm that is actionable-will allow them to more accurately predict the
limits of how much they must look for incidental findings and for how long.
No longer will they question whether they need to go outside of their protocol to search for findings, since the duty to rescue obligates no one to search
out harm that can be prevented. 121
Traditional research ethics convey that subjects enroll in a study and undergo the necessary risks of the study to help achieve the research objective.122
116. See Richardson & Belsky, supra note 84, at 26 (affirming that the recognition of moral
demands obligate the financial and political resources of study sponsors).
117. Fabsitz et al., supra note 1, at 577 (maintaining that an obligation to return individual
results requires researchers and funders to ensure sufficient resources are available to fulfill the
requirement).
118. Wolf, supra note 4, at 217.
119. Meyer, supra note 7, at 45.
120. See Alan C. Milstein, Research Mapratice and the Issue of InidentalFindings, 36 J. L. MElD.
& ETHics 356, 357 (2008) (describing his own hesitance for supporting obligations that may
create substantially less research).
121. See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 7, at 476 ("[In genomic research, our experience
suggests that investigators sometimes do hunt for results beyond the scope of the research
project and consider recontact.').
122. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 45 (describing the purported purpose of research participation as achieving the research end).
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Therefore, a claim that neither the obligation to achieve the research objective
nor the obligation to return individual results trumps the other 23 fails to consider the possibility of an obligation to return individual results becoming so
costly as to prevent this study objective from being achieved. In this scenario,
subjects without individual results to receive will have sustained the burdens
of research without the benefit of completing the study as promised.124 ignoring the reality of fixed budgets and limited resources can lead to these ethical
conclusions, along with comparisons of disclosure to pillars of ethical research
such as providing informed consent.125 This has a potentially disastrous effect
of bioethicists turning their preferences into obligations and causing researchers to "throw the ethical baby out with the bathwater, deciding that all bioethical pronouncements are unrealistic and eschewing clear obligations like ensuring truly voluntary, informed consent."126
The public expects that resources for research will be applied to the ultimate goal of improving health;127 yet, diverting resources to returning individual results that may not be fully utilized to prevent harm is hardly complying with such expectations.128 Therefore, the ethical conclusion is to maintain
the requirement of conducting good science intended to benefit society as the
primary goal, meanwhile, resources are diverted only in cases where serious
harm can be prevented and the ultimate objective can still be realized.129
D. Challenges to a Rescue-Based Approach
Inevitably one critique of an obligation to return individual results based
on a duty to rescue will find that it creates a paternalistic approach to limiting
access to one's information. This stance, which presumably would center on
a person's right to access their own genetic information, disregards accepted
ethical principles of research and the practicalities of conducting genomic
research. Every enrollee will have individual genetic information obtained by
123. Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 1, at 14.
124. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 45 (discussing the costs of returning results and the ethical
paradox of requiring their return such that insufficient resources are available to research the
very ends that supposedly motivated the subjects to enroll).
125. See Fernandez & Weijer, supra note 7, at 45 (finding that both informed consent and
returning individual results are moral obligations, making the costs of fulfilling each the cost of
conducting ethical research).
126. Meyer, supra note 7, at 46. See also Ossorio, supra note 32, at 25 ("[If IRBs withheld
approvals of protocols because IRBs routinely balanced all the numerous factors differently
than researchers, then researchers might consider the review as arbitrary and might resist or
undermine the ethics protections imposed.").
127. Beskow, supra note 17, at 39.
128. See Ormond, supra note 19, at 31 ("[E]xperience suggests that patients may or may not
follow through on these stated hypothetical plans after they receive genetic test results."). See
also Clayton, supra note 20, at 290-91 (discussing the phenomenon of people who know they
are genetically at risk opting not to be tested when given a choice).
129. Beskow, supra note 17, at 39.
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the researcher; yet, as discussed above it would be extremely onerous to provide all of this information or ascertain the preferences of each subject to
determine what they want to be provided. The purpose of research is not to
supply individual information and asserting an ethical obligation to do so
comes dangerously close to encouraging a therapeutic misconception. The
potential for subjects to enroll in the hopes of discovering clinically relevant
genetic information that may never be found is a disconcerting proposition.
A rescue-based model is less at risk of increasing a therapeutic misconception because it places no higher moral obligation on researchers than any
other person. They are simply obligated to act when there is harm that can be
prevented with comparably little risk to the study itself. In this way, the rescue approach also creates a standard that is clear and comprehensible for the
average person. This has the dual effect of reducing therapeutic misconception while generating trust in the research enterprise by presenting more definitive obligations of researchers. 130 Meanwhile, researchers are able to continue the pursuit of generalizable knowledge while protecting subjects-the
original purpose of research ethics-without subverting the ethical framework
to require each subject's preferences be catered to.
The argument of paternalism also fails to recognize the burden placed on
subjects to understand genetic information prior to enrollment, when deciding
what information they want to receive, and after they receive the information. 131 With the complexities between genotypes and phenotypes, it is
difficult to imagine how enough information could be given to ensure that
subjects fully understand the decision they are making.132 Evidence demonstrates there is a difference in subject preferences with regard to hypothetically
receiving genetic information and actually receiving it, which exhibits the lack
of true understanding among the general public.
This fact can be found in the lack of interest in genetic testing and those
who state a desire for information but take no action to acquire it.133 Furthermore, these hypothetical responses may differ if respondents truly understood the limited validity and itility of most individual results.1M Even with
best efforts to explain results, there is a strong chance that information will be
misinterpreted or inappropriately followed up.135 In reality, a more limited
obligation to return only results that can prevent serious harm will make it
130. See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 7, at 476 (discussing the importance of promoting
trust in research without transforming it into an extension of the clinic).
131. See id. at 476 ("Helping people understand complex, probabilistic information is hard
enough; it becomes much more difficult when that information is new and its clinical impact is
not clear.').
132. Beskow & Burke, supranote 7, at 1.
133. Clayton & McGuire, supranote 7, at 474.
134. Beskow & Burke, supra note 7, at 1. See also Clayton & McGuire, supra note 7, at 474
(finding interest in genetic testing is lower than expected especially for disorders that are not
readily treatable or preventable).
135. Clayton & McGuire, supranote 7, at 476.
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easier for subjects to understand what information will be returned and why it
is important that they receive it.
Another criticism may be linked to the expanding desire to include reproductive interests into an obligation to return individual results. 3 6 This
expansion disregards the fact that ethical principles of research provide very
limited obligations to individual subjects because their primary purpose is to
protect subjects while the study goal is being pursued. Given this limit to
individuals, it cannot follow that they provide obligations to non-existent offspring that has yet to be conceived. The reproductive concerns should be
stated more accurately to reflect ethical obligations to the potential life that
may exist in the future, rather than enrolled subjects. Yet, even the duty to
rescue cannot extend to a theoretical life that may or may not exist at some
point in the future.
One concern found with incidental findings in genomic research that the
rescue approach does not necessarily eliminate is clearly delineating what exactly qualifies as meeting an obligation to disclose. A majority of genetic variants are merely linked with increased risk of a certain disease and the duty to
rescue does not state which percentage increases and what diseases specifically
qualify. However, the point of determining the proper ethical justification for
disclosure is not to draw a line which sets what percentages and diseases qualify. In a relatively young field such as genomic research, where new discoveries are made on a regular basis, rigidity would only be more of a hindrance.
The problem of lacking clear definitions of what genetic variants must be
disclosed can be found with every other model, and the rescue approach has
the benefit of narrowing the choices by providing both a floor and a ceiling to
investigator obligations while maintaining a requisite flexibility.
IV.

CONCLUSION

By its very nature, research is meant to benefit society at large. Meanwhile, ethical principles are in place to protect those individuals selfless
enough to volunteer for research trials. With very few positive actions owed
to individual subjects, the increasing trend to demand the return of individual
results in genomic research is essentially creating a new framework under
which trials should operate. While the argument is made that it is the ethically
appropriate action to take, the reality of limited resources demonstrate why
the traditional research paradigm was created in the first place.
The duty to rescue creates a narrow obligation to return individual results, while maintaining the ethically justifiable foundation of protecting subjects during the pursuit of the greater good. By neglecting a complete analysis
of the resources required to fulfill a broad obligation, many have underesti136. Susan Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subyects Research: Anaysis and
Recommendations, 36J. L. MED. & ETHICs 219, 228 (2008) (finding obligations to return incidental
findings that a subject would find important to their reproductive decision-making).
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mated the ethical value of maximizing the use of resources to pursue sound
research. Perhaps if they had looked a little closer at the consequences of
such an expansive requirement, they would have seen that preserving generalizable knowledge as the primary goal of research is the best way to get the
most bang for your buck.

